<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<title>Research Papers</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104843" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104843</id>
<updated>2026-04-11T18:48:26Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-04-11T18:48:26Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>What is cybersecurity? Explorations in automated knowledge generation</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141765" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Choucri, Nazli</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Elbait, Gihan Daw</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Madnick, Stuart E.</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141765</id>
<updated>2022-05-05T16:16:15Z</updated>
<published>2012-11-06T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">What is cybersecurity? Explorations in automated knowledge generation
Choucri, Nazli; Elbait, Gihan Daw; Madnick, Stuart E.
This paper addresses a serious impediment to theory and policy for cybersecurity: Trivial as it might appear on the surface, there is no agreed upon understanding of the issue, no formal definition, and not even a consensus on the mere spelling of the terms –– so that efforts to develop policies and postures, or capture relevant knowledge are seriously hampered. In this context, we present a “proof of concept” for a new research strategy based on a close examination of a large corpus of scholarly knowledge, and the extent to which it enables us to generate new knowledge about cybersecurity of relevance to international relations and to national security relevant to the nation’s security and to international relations. Given the new cyber realities, this paper is also a “proof” of how to create new knowledge through automated investigations of the record to date.
</summary>
<dc:date>2012-11-06T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Knightian auctions</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141764" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Chiesa, Alessandro</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Micali, Silvio</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Zhu, Zeyuan Allen</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141764</id>
<updated>2022-04-08T03:23:42Z</updated>
<published>2012-01-10T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Knightian auctions
Chiesa, Alessandro; Micali, Silvio; Zhu, Zeyuan Allen
We study single-good auctions in a setting where each player knows his own valuation only within a constant multiplicative factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and the mech- anism designer knows δ. The classical notions of implementation in dominant strategies and implementation in undominated strategies are naturally extended to this setting, but their power is vastly different.&#13;
On the negative side, we prove that no dominant-strategy mechanism can guarantee social welfare that is significantly better than that achievable by as- signing the good to a random player.&#13;
On the positive side, we provide tight upper and lower bounds for the fraction of the maximum social welfare achievable in undominated strategies, whether deterministically or probabilistically.
</summary>
<dc:date>2012-01-10T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Possibilistic beliefs and higher-level rationality</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141763" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Chen, Jing</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Micali, Silvio</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Pass, Rafael</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141763</id>
<updated>2022-04-08T03:28:43Z</updated>
<published>2014-06-09T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Possibilistic beliefs and higher-level rationality
Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio; Pass, Rafael
We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible with the players being level-k rational coincide with the strategies surviving a natural k-step iterated elimination procedure. We view the latter strategies as the (level-k) rationalizable ones in our possibilistic setting.&#13;
Rationalizability was defined by Pearce [23] and Bernheim [12] for complete-information settings. Our iterated elimination procedure is similar to that proposed by Dekel, Fuden- berg, and Morris [14] in a Bayesian setting. For other iterated elimination procedures and corresponding notions of rationalizability in Bayesian settings, see Brandenburger and Dekel [9], Tan and Werlang [24], Battigalli and Siniscalchi [8], Ely and Peski [15], Weinstein and Yildiz [25], and Halpern and Pass [19].
</summary>
<dc:date>2014-06-09T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141762" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Chen, Jing</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Hassidim, Avinatan</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Micali, Silvio</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141762</id>
<updated>2022-04-08T03:28:31Z</updated>
<published>2010-01-13T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players
Chen, Jing; Hassidim, Avinatan; Micali, Silvio
We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities,&#13;
• Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium;&#13;
• Is perfectly resilient to the problems of collusion, complexity, and privacy; and • Works for any number of players n &gt; 1.
</summary>
<dc:date>2010-01-13T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Simulation modeling for cyber resilience</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141761" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Siegel, Michael</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Goldsmith, Daniel</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141761</id>
<updated>2022-04-08T03:03:18Z</updated>
<published>2010-10-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Simulation modeling for cyber resilience
Siegel, Michael; Goldsmith, Daniel
Identifying high-leverage intervention points to increase cyber resiliency—the ability to provide and maintain acceptable service levels in the face of challenges— requires identifying, integrating, and framing a diverse set of strategies that cut across boundaries of governments, corporation, non-profits, and individuals. Drawing on a preliminary framework developed by Jonathan Zittrain, we identify several sources of corporate interventions and suggest possible trajectories for intervention effectiveness over time by utilizing simulation modeling. The overall goal of this research is to develop innovative management and operational approaches using experts, emerging data sets, policy analysis, and relevant theory, along with simulation-modeling, to enable real-world implementation of high-leverage opportunities to promote corporate resiliency to cyber threats.
</summary>
<dc:date>2010-10-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Understanding cyber complexity: Systems modeling and the financial services sector</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141760" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Goldsmith, Daniel</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Siegel, Michael</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141760</id>
<updated>2022-04-08T03:38:25Z</updated>
<published>2010-02-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Understanding cyber complexity: Systems modeling and the financial services sector
Goldsmith, Daniel; Siegel, Michael
Recent developments within the financial services sector have demonstrated that as the diffusion of cyber enabled technologies increases, so too does dependency on a cyber infrastructure susceptible to failure, outages, and attacks. While current efforts are underway to introduce new methodologies and techniques to manage risks, particularly localized risks (such as those at a particular firm), developing resiliency at the system level requires transformative thinking to increase collaborative situational awareness, improve our understanding of risk, foster strategic coordination, and define actionable plans at the sector level to address pervasive sector-wide risk. The overall goal of this research is to develop innovative management and operational approaches using experts and emerging data sets available from the financial services industry along with simulation-driven technologies to enable real-world implementation of high- leverage opportunities to promote financial services resiliency.
</summary>
<dc:date>2010-02-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Systematic approaches to cyber insecurity</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141759" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Goldsmith, Daniel</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Siegel, Michael</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141759</id>
<updated>2022-04-08T03:17:30Z</updated>
<published>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Systematic approaches to cyber insecurity
Goldsmith, Daniel; Siegel, Michael
Recent developments have demonstrated that as the diffusion of cyber enabled technologies increases, so too does dependency on a cyber infrastructure susceptible to failure, outages, and attacks. While current efforts are underway to introduce new methodologies and techniques to manage risks, particularly localized risks (such as those at a particular firm), developing resiliency at the system level requires transformative thinking to increase collaborative situational awareness, improve our understanding of risk, foster strategic coordination, and define actionable plans at the sector level to address pervasive sector-wide risk. The overall goal of this research is to develop innovative management and operational approaches using experts, emerging data sets, policy analysis, and relevant theory, along with simulation- modeling, to enable real-world implementation of high-leverage opportunities to promote corporate resiliency to cyber threats.
</summary>
<dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Perspectives on cybersecurity: A collaborative study</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141758" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Choucri, Nazli</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Jackson, Chrisma</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141758</id>
<updated>2022-05-05T16:16:32Z</updated>
<published>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Perspectives on cybersecurity: A collaborative study
Choucri, Nazli; Jackson, Chrisma
1. Cybersecurity – Problems, Premises, Perspectives&#13;
2 An Abbreviated Technical Perspective on Cybersecurity&#13;
3 The Conceptual Underpinning of Cyber Security Studies&#13;
4 Cyberspace as the Domain of Content&#13;
5 DoD Perspective on Cyberspace&#13;
6 China’s Perspective on Cyber Security&#13;
7 Pursuing Deterrence Internationally in Cyberspace&#13;
8 Is Deterrence Possible in Cyber Warfare?&#13;
9 A Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Interactions between Contemporary Transnational Activism and Digital Communication
</summary>
<dc:date>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Integrating cyberspace and international relations: The co-evolution dilemma</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141757" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Choucri, Nazli</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Clark, David D</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141757</id>
<updated>2026-02-05T21:18:40Z</updated>
<published>2012-11-06T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Integrating cyberspace and international relations: The co-evolution dilemma
Choucri, Nazli; Clark, David D
Cyberspace is a fact of daily life. Until recently cyberspace was considered largely a matter of low politics – the term used to denote background conditions and routine decisions and processes. By contrast high politics is about national security, core institutions, and decision systems that are critical to the state, its interests, and its underlying values. We now see cyberspace shaping the domain of high politics, and high politics shaping the future of cyberspace. The field of international relations, rooted in 20th century issues and theories, has not kept pace with the emerging significance of cyberspace.&#13;
This paper addresses what we call the co-evolution dilemma: as cyberspace and international politics now start to shape each other, we have few conceptual anchors to fully identify, let alone model, the potential collision of law, policy and practice in the cyber arena with shared norms, common practices, and modes of interactions in international relations that have evolved over time. At a minimum, we need to develop a map of the joint domain of cyberspace and international relations.&#13;
Our purpose here is to (1) develop an alignment strategy to connect the Internet, the core of cyberspace, and international relations (2) introduce the control point analysis, a method we have developed to explicate dynamics among cyber-actors, in terms of their relative power and influence, and (3) highlight critical co-evolution parameters embedded in the fabric of world politics.
</summary>
<dc:date>2012-11-06T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Rational robustness for mechanism design</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141756" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Chen, Jing</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Micali, Silvio</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141756</id>
<updated>2022-04-08T15:31:34Z</updated>
<published>2009-11-10T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Rational robustness for mechanism design
Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio
The currently prevailing equilibrium-based approach to mechanism design suffers from a plurality of fundamental problems, and new conceptual frameworks are needed to solve or sufficiently alleviate them.&#13;
In this paper, we put forward rational robustness, a new solution concept implementation notion that is not equilibrium-based; prove its fundamental structural theorems; and compare it with prior notions.&#13;
Our notion of implementation is specifically built so as to be robust against the problem of equilibrium selection. We prove it robust against other fundamental problems as well in different papers.
First Draft.
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-11-10T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Resilient mechanism design foundations for governance of cyberspace: Exploration in theory, strategy, and policy</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141755" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Micali, Silvio</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Choucri, Nazli</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Chen, Jing</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Williams, Cindy</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141755</id>
<updated>2022-05-05T16:17:11Z</updated>
<published>2013-09-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Resilient mechanism design foundations for governance of cyberspace: Exploration in theory, strategy, and policy
Micali, Silvio; Choucri, Nazli; Chen, Jing; Williams, Cindy
Three related trends in world politics – shifting in power relations, increased diversity of actors and entities, and the growing mobilization and politicization of global constituencies are contributing to a global “tussle” which threatens to erupt in a full-fledged international confrontation. Such contests may well reinforce the potentially powerful cleavages, such as those that became evident before, during, and after the World Conference on Information Technology, WCIT-2012. If present trends continue, it is unlikely that WCIT-2013 will reduce the cleavages and resolve the contentions.
We would like to thank Professor Lucas Stanczyk, Department of Political Science, MIT, for comments on an earlier version.
</summary>
<dc:date>2013-09-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Exploring terms and taxonomies relating to the cyber international relations research field: Or are "cyberspace" and "cyber space" the same?</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141754" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Camiña, Steven</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Madnick, Stuart E.</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Choucri, Nazli</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Woon, Wei Lee</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141754</id>
<updated>2022-05-05T16:17:34Z</updated>
<published>2011-08-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Exploring terms and taxonomies relating to the cyber international relations research field: Or are "cyberspace" and "cyber space" the same?
Camiña, Steven; Madnick, Stuart E.; Choucri, Nazli; Woon, Wei Lee
This project has at least two facets to it: (1) advancing the algorithms in the sub-field of bibliometrics often referred to as "text mining" whereby hundreds of thousands of documents (such as journal articles) are scanned and relationships amongst words and phrases are established and (2) applying these tools in support of the Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR) research effort. In international relations, it is important that all the parties understand each other. Although dictionaries, glossaries, and other sources tell you what words/phrases are supposed to mean (somewhat complicated by the fact that they often contradict each other), they do not tell you how people are actually using them.&#13;
As an example, when we started, we assumed that "cyberspace" and "cyber space" were essentially the same word with just a minor variation in punctuation (i.e., the space, or lack thereof, between "cyber" and "space") and that the choice of the punctuation was a rather random occurrence. With that assumption in mind, we would expect that the taxonomies that would be constructed by our algorithms using "cyberspace" and "cyber space" as seed terms would be basically the same. As it turned out, they were quite different, both in overall shape and groupings within the taxonomy.&#13;
Since the overall field of cyber international relations is so new, understanding the field and how people think about (as evidenced by their actual usage of terminology, and how usage changes over time) is an important goal as part of the overall ECIR project.
</summary>
<dc:date>2011-08-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Explorations in cyber international relations (ECIR)—data dashboard report #1: CERT data sources and prototype dashboard system</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141750" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Madnick, Stuart E.</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Choucri, Nazli</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Camiña, Steven</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Fogg, Erik</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Li, Xitong</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Woon, Wei Lee</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141750</id>
<updated>2022-05-05T16:18:27Z</updated>
<published>2009-08-10T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Explorations in cyber international relations (ECIR)—data dashboard report #1: CERT data sources and prototype dashboard system
Madnick, Stuart E.; Choucri, Nazli; Camiña, Steven; Fogg, Erik; Li, Xitong; Woon, Wei Lee
Growing global interconnection and interdependency of computer networks, in combination with increased sophistication of cyber attacks over time, demonstrate the need for better understanding of the collective and cooperative security measures needed to prevent and respond to cybersecurity emergencies. The Exploring Cyber International Relations (ECIR) Data Dashboard project is an initial effort to gather and analyze such data within and between countries. This report describes the prototype ECIR Data Dashboard and the initial data sources used.&#13;
In 1988, the United States Department of Defense and Carnegie Mellon University formed the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) to lead and coordinate national and international efforts to combat cybsersecurity threats. Since then, the number of CERTs worldwide has grown dramatically, leading to the potential for a sophisticated and coordinated global cybersecurity response network. This report focuses primarily on the current state of the worldwide CERTs, including the data publicly available, the extent of coordination, and the maturity of data management and responses. The report summarizes, analyses, and critiques the worldwide CERT network.&#13;
Additionally, the report describes the ECIR team's Data Dashboard project, designed to provide scholars, policymakers, IT professionals, and other stakeholders with a comprehensive set of data on national-level cybersecurity, information technology, and demographic data. The Dashboard allows these stakeholders to observe chronological trends and multivariate correlations that can lead to insight into the current state, potential future trends, and approximate causes of global cybersecurity issues. This report summarizes the purpose, state, progress, and challenges of developing the Data Dashboard project.
Disclaimer: This report relies on publicly available information, especially from the CERTs’ pubic web sites. They have not yet been contacted to confirm our understanding of their data. That will be done in subsequent phases of this effort.
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-08-10T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>System dynamics modeling for pro-active intelligence</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141749" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Anderson, Ed</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Choucri, Nazli</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Goldsmith, Daniel</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Madnick, Stuart E.</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Siegel, Michael</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Sturtevant, Dan</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141749</id>
<updated>2022-05-05T16:18:58Z</updated>
<published>2009-11-04T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">System dynamics modeling for pro-active intelligence
Anderson, Ed; Choucri, Nazli; Goldsmith, Daniel; Madnick, Stuart E.; Siegel, Michael; Sturtevant, Dan
The Pro-Active Intelligence (PAINT) program, sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), was formed to address the challenges1 posed by distributed human networks, including terrorists and insurgencies, both independent and state-sponsored. In particular, certain threats (including emerging dual-use technologies) are difficult to detect using traditional intelligence means because: (a) indicators are difficult to discern and may give little warning time, (b) there is usually limited relevant data collection and integration capability, and (c) expertise is generally diverse and disconnected.&#13;
Over the course of 18 months from September 2007 to February 2009, an effort, led by researchers from MIT, was initiated to develop computational social science models to study and understand the dynamics of complex intelligence targets for nefarious technology activities (broadly defined as activities outside U.S. national interest). System dynamics models were developed because they offered great opportunities to (a) understand and represent determinants of nefarious technology development, (b) to identify aspects of critical pathways, such as resource management, towards the development of nefarious technologies, and (c) support a modeling based strategy for the identification of new sources of intelligence.&#13;
This report describes the “System Dynamics Modeling for Pro-Active Intelligence” effort and its two thrusts: (a) development of a comprehensive holistic system dynamics model to represent, understand, and differentiate nefarious and benign activities and (b) the development of a detailed system dynamics resource model that can be used as a component of a multi-method federation of models. In both cases, simulations were conducted to illustrate the effectiveness of these models in demonstrating system behavior and, on occasion, highlighting potentially counter-intuitive behaviors.
Final Report: Proactive Intelligence (PAINT)&#13;
&#13;
CONTRACT FA8750-07-C-0101 ISSUED BY AFRL/IFKE CODE FA8750 6. &#13;
ADMINISTERED BY CODE N62879 USAF, AFMC AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY 26 ELECTRONIC PARKWAY&#13;
ROME NY 13441-4514
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-11-04T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Applications of ECIR modeling work to cyber policy problems</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141700" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Williams, Cindy</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141700</id>
<updated>2022-04-07T03:23:23Z</updated>
<published>2011-03-10T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Applications of ECIR modeling work to cyber policy problems
Williams, Cindy
One element of core research underway in Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR) at MIT is dynamic modeling, simulation, and analysis. During 2010 and 2011, this research has pushed forward theoretical frontiers in the modeling of resilient mechanisms to explore the interactions of players involved in multi-player auctions and games, under assumptions that are substantially more realistic than those underlying more traditional models. In the coming year, the team hopes in addition to expand on earlier research in the area of fair electronic exchange. This paper explores three examples of future cyber IR policy applications of the work in dynamic modeling, simulation, and analysis.
</summary>
<dc:date>2011-03-10T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Understanding ICANN’s complexity in a growing and changing Internet</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141699" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Testart, Cecilia</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141699</id>
<updated>2022-04-07T03:13:40Z</updated>
<published>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Understanding ICANN’s complexity in a growing and changing Internet
Testart, Cecilia
The ever-increasing relevance of the Internet in all aspects of our lives has significantly raised the interest of cyberspace in the political, economical and international spheres. Internet governance and its future design are now relevant to many different stakeholders eager to influence and engage in the decision and policy-making processes. The Internet Corporations for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is recognized as the central institution involved in the governance of the global Internet. Specifically, it is in charge of the allocation, coordination and development of policy relating to the critical Internet resources –Internet Protocol addresses, Domain Names System and parameter numbers. It was created in 1998, when the Internet had less than 10% of the current Internet users and the World Wide Web potential was just emerging, and was expected to have a technical mandate. Over time, ICANN structure has evolved, resulting in a large and complex institution, with several internal bodies intermingled with its functions. Nonetheless, a very limited number of Internet users know what ICANN is or what ICANN does, because the Internet has always “just worked”. This paper contributes to the understanding of who participates in ICANN’s decision-making and policy-development processes and how. It first examines in details the internal structure of the organization, and then its structural and financial evolution and change since its early stage. The study is based on an in-depth analysis of the legal, financial and public documents of ICANN, as well as the information published directly by ICANN’s internal bodies. The paper reveals the substantial expansion in scale and scope of ICANN mandate and activities since its creation. ICANN recurring changes leading to the current complex structure and processes for policy development, allowed it to cope with and adapt to growth, evolution and change in the Internet and its usages. Additionally, these processes constitute an outreach mechanism for ICANN to its constituencies. However, the permanent internal restructuring, deter and hinder the follow up by external interested parties such as governments and international organizations, which are now requesting more involvement in policy-development processes concerning the Internet.
</summary>
<dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Anonymity networks: New platforms for conflict and contention</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141698" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Rady, Mina</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141698</id>
<updated>2022-04-07T03:02:23Z</updated>
<published>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Anonymity networks: New platforms for conflict and contention
Rady, Mina
Access to information is critical during population uprisings against repressive regimes. As a venue for information and data exchange, cyberspace offers many powerful social platforms for exchange of information. But the infrastructure of the Internet allows government to block or censor such platforms. In turn, anonymity networks emerged as conventional mechanisms for Internet users to circumvent government censorship. In this paper we show that anonymity networks became “terrains” for government-population conflict as they enable citizens to overpower governments’ conventional control mechanisms over cyber- information exchanges. We delineate escalations of this cyber-conflict by studying two notable cases: Egypt, a simple case, and Iran, a more complex case. We take Tor network as the anonymity network that is subject of investigation. We highlight the range of actions that each actor can take to retaliate via anonymity networks. We conclude that design specifications and protocols of anonymous communication determine the strategies of escalation. Finally, we lay out the foundation for monitoring and analyzing dynamics and control point analysis of anonymous networks.
</summary>
<dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fair electronic exchange with virtual trusted parties</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141697" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Micali, Silvio</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141697</id>
<updated>2023-09-02T05:23:50Z</updated>
<summary type="text">Fair electronic exchange with virtual trusted parties
Micali, Silvio
Assume each of two parties has something the other wants. Then, a Fair exchange is an electronic protocol guaranteeing that either both parties get what they want, or none of them does. Protocols relying on traditional trusted parties easily guarantee such exchanges, but are inefficient and expensive, because a trusted party must be part of (thus be paid for) every execution.&#13;
We put forward a new class of protocols, relying on virtual trusted parties (a new type of trusted party), and show that they provide Fair exchange more efficiently than before, and at a fraction of the cost. In particular, we provide attractive protocols for Fair certified e-mail and contract signing.
</summary>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The Chinese Internet: Control through the layers</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141696" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Hung, Shirley</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141696</id>
<updated>2022-04-07T03:22:29Z</updated>
<published>2012-10-30T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">The Chinese Internet: Control through the layers
Hung, Shirley
China is often described as having the world’s most advanced Internet censorship and surveillance regime.1 It garners much fear and attention in the media and among policymakers, yet most reports focus on specific incidents or capabilities, not the system as a whole. The Great Firewall, which generally refers to the technical implementation of controls, is the most well- known part of the system, but the overall control regime includes a significant human element ranging from police persecution of dissidents to human censors who review individual blog and social media posts to the self-censorship that has become an almost reflexive response among citizens. The control regime implemented by China is in many ways exactly what one would expect of a rational, forward-looking, planning-oriented authoritarian regime determined to remain in power while retaining legitimacy: extensive, pervasive, deeply integrated into the technical apparatus of the Internet, and both reflective of and entwined with the political and social structures in which it is embedded. It is not a perfect regime – not every post the government would deem undesirable is caught or removed – but it is good enough. It utilizes technical tools, self-censorship, and human review to create a system with enough built-in flexibility to enable a fine-grained control of which most political leaders around the world can only dream.
</summary>
<dc:date>2012-10-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Cyber conflicts in international relations: Framework and case studies</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141695" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Gamero-Garrido, Alexander</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141695</id>
<updated>2022-04-07T03:28:25Z</updated>
<published>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Cyber conflicts in international relations: Framework and case studies
Gamero-Garrido, Alexander
Although cyber conflict is no longer considered particularly unusual, significant uncertainties remain about the nature, scale, scope and other critical features of it. This study addresses a subset of these issues by developing an internally consistent framework and applying it to a series of 17 case studies. We present each case in terms of (a) its socio-political context, (b) technical features, (c) the outcome and inferences drawn in the sources examined. The profile of each case includes the actors, their actions, tools they used and power relationships, and the outcomes with inferences or observations. Our findings include:&#13;
• Cyberspace has brought in a number of new players – activists, shady government contractors – to international conflict, and traditional actors (notably states) have increasingly recognized the importance of the domain.&#13;
• The involvement of the private sector on cybersecurity (“cyber defense”) has been critical: 16 out of the 17 cases studied involved the private sector either in attack or defense.&#13;
• All of the major international cyber conflicts presented here have been related to an ongoing conflict (“attack” or “war”) in the physical domain.&#13;
• Rich industrialized countries with a highly developed ICT infrastructure are at a higher risk concerning cyber attacks.&#13;
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is by far the most common type of cyber attack.&#13;
• Air-gapped (not connected to the public Internet) networks have not been exempt from attacks.&#13;
• A perpetrator does not need highly specialized technical knowledge to intrude computer networks.&#13;
• The potential damage of a cyber strike is likely to continue increasing as the Internet expands.&#13;
• The size of the actor under attack could have an influence on its ability to deter the attackers with actions in the physical world.&#13;
• The entrance barriers (including the monetary cost) for any actor to get involved in a conflict seem to be much lower in the cyber domain than in the physical domain.&#13;
• Accountability on the Internet is difficult, and gets further obscured when the attacks transcend national borders. This fact has probably made cyber attacks desirable for major military powers such as China, Russia and the United States.&#13;
In many ways, this paper is a re-analysis of the case studies set presented on A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 recently published by the Atlantic Council. In addition, we draw upon other materials (academic and media) to expand our understanding of each case, and add several cases to the original collection resulting in a data set of 17 cyber conflict, spanning almost three decades (1985-2013). Cuckoo's Egg, Morris Worm, Solar Sunrise, Electronic Disturbance Theater, ILOVEYOU, Chinese Espionage, Estonia, Russo-Georgian war, Conficker, NSA-Snowden, WikiLeaks and Stuxnet are some of the major cases included.
</summary>
<dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Three views of cyberspace</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141694" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Clark, David D</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141694</id>
<updated>2026-02-05T21:20:11Z</updated>
<published>2011-01-05T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Three views of cyberspace
Clark, David D
The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to an important but perhaps under- appreciated aspect of the Internet: the emergent idea of a global commons in the use of the Internet, in which people might transcend national boundaries to discuss, plan and organize to further matters of global import, whether environmental regulation, curbing epidemics, mitigating poverty, reducing risks of nuclear wars, promoting individual freedoms, etc. This paper attempts to construct a framework to assess what this commons might be, variations in its practices, the threats it faces, and both technological and political means of protecting or at least preserving it.
</summary>
<dc:date>2011-01-05T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Tools of engagement: Mapping the tussles in cyberspace</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141693" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Clark, David D</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141693</id>
<updated>2026-02-05T21:20:36Z</updated>
<published>2012-03-12T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Tools of engagement: Mapping the tussles in cyberspace
Clark, David D
This paper has been prepared as part of the Explorations in Cyber International Relations project being carried out at MIT, Harvard and collaborating institutions. The goal of this paper is to lay the groundwork for the exploration of a fundamental thesis of the project: that the emergence of cyberspace as a phenomenon has shifted the motivations of the various actors that play on the international stage, it has added to the “tools of engagement” that these actors use as they interact, and it has created or empowered new sorts of actors that must now be taken into account in any theory of international relations.&#13;
This paper, which should at this point be seen as a working draft, incomplete and anecdotal rather than scholarly and thorough, attempts to catalog by example the range of actors and the tools they use as they interact around and in cyberspace. Through these anecdotes, I illustrate classes of actors who either have a motivation to shape cyberspace, or who seem to have undergone a shift in power (up or down) by the emergence of cyberspace, and who are responding to or exploiting this situation.&#13;
Using various examples, we can start to catalog some of the means by which different actors can exercise influence in cyberspace, and as well understand the new actors that seem to have significant power to influence. At a high level, we want to explore three related questions.&#13;
1.1&#13;
• • •&#13;
What are the tools of influence, both direct and indirect, and to what extent does cyberspace create distinctive behavior? Is there anything new?&#13;
Are there new actors that appear as players in the space of influence—actors that a traditional state actor would not regularly expect to deal with?&#13;
When influence is exercises, what actors are the preferred targets of that influence?
</summary>
<dc:date>2012-03-12T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Characterizing cyberspace: Past, present and future</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141692" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Clark, David D</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141692</id>
<updated>2026-02-05T21:13:50Z</updated>
<published>2010-03-12T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Characterizing cyberspace: Past, present and future
Clark, David D
In general terms, most practitioners share a working concept of cyberspace—it is the collection of computing devices connected by networks in which electronic information is stored and utilized, and communication takes place1. Another way to understand the nature of cyberspace is to articulate its purpose, which I will describe as the processing, manipulation and exploitation of information, the facilitation and augmentation of communication among people, and the interaction of people and information. Both information and people are central to the power of cyberspace. If we seek a better understanding of what cyberspace might be, one approach is to identify its salient characteristics: a catalog of its characteristics may be more useful than a list of competing definitions.
</summary>
<dc:date>2010-03-12T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Toward the design of a future Internet</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141691" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Clark, David D</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141691</id>
<updated>2026-02-05T21:21:24Z</updated>
<published>2009-10-10T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Toward the design of a future Internet
Clark, David D
This document is one very preliminary proposal for the design of a Future Internet—an outline of requirements and architecture. This document should only be seen as a first step in such a proposal; there are many parts that remain to be considered and elaborated. But it does try to offer a rationale for making key design systems.
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-10-10T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The expressive power of the Internet design</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141690" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Clark, David D</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141690</id>
<updated>2026-02-05T21:16:30Z</updated>
<published>2009-04-27T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">The expressive power of the Internet design
Clark, David D
The present Internet is not defined in terms of its semantics, at least at the packet level. The loose packet carriage model of “what comes out is what went in” is intentionally almost semantics-free. The packets just carry bytes. Packet boundaries can have some limited semantics, but not much. The original design presumed some constraints on the semantics of packet headers, such as global addresses, but the progress of time has violated these and the Internet keeps working. TCP does impose some modest semantic constraints, but of course TCP is optional, and not a mandatory part of the architecture.&#13;
What defines the Internet, and the range of behavior that is available in the Internet, is the expressive power of the packet header, which has more to do with its format than any semantics. Most fields (e.g. packet length) are unremarkable, some (like the TOS bits) have been redefined several times in the history of the Internet, some (like the options) have atrophied, and some (most obviously the IP addresses) have had a most interesting history in which the only constants are that they are 32 bit fields, that whatever value they have at each end must remain constant for the life of a TCP connection (because of the pseudo-header) and that at any locale in the network, they must provide the basis for some router action. They can be rewritten (as in NAT), turned into logical addresses (as in multicast or anycast), and they can be microcoded in a number of ways to capture address hierarchy (net/rest, A/B/C, CIDR). All that really matters is that they are 32 bits long, and that at any point, they must have at least local meaning to a forwarding process.
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-04-27T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The Theory of Lateral Pressure  Highlights of Quantification &amp; Empirical Analysis</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105890" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Choucri, Nazli</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105890</id>
<updated>2023-08-22T17:35:48Z</updated>
<published>2016-11-11T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">The Theory of Lateral Pressure  Highlights of Quantification &amp; Empirical Analysis
Choucri, Nazli
Lateral Pressure refers to any tendency (or propensity) of individuals and societies to expand their activities and exert influence and control beyond their established boundaries, whether for economic, political, military, scientific, religious, or other purposes. Framed by Robert C. North and Nazli Choucri, the theory addresses the sources and consequences of such a tendency.&#13;
Lateral Pressure theory seeks to explain the relationships between state characteristics and patterns of international behavior. The theory addresses the sources and consequences of transformation and change in international relations and provides a basis for analyzing potential feedback dynamics. To the extent that states expand their activities outside territorial boundaries – driven by a wide range of capabilities and motivations – they are likely to encounter other states similarly engaged. The intersection among spheres of influence is the first step in complex dynamics leading hostilities, escalation, and eventually to conflict and violence. These processes are contingent on the actors’ intents, capabilities, and activities. &#13;
The causal logic in lateral pressure theory runs from the internal drivers, that is, the master variables that shape the profiles of states -- through the intervening variables, namely, aggregated and articulated demands given prevailing capabilities -- the outcome often generates added complexities.&#13;
This paper proceeds as follows: First we highlight the basic features of lateral pressure theory, its core components, and their interconnections. Some aspects are more readily quantifiable than others. Some are more consistent with conventional theory in international relations. Others are based on insights and evidence from other areas of knowledge, thus departing from tradition in potentially significant ways. Second, we summarize the phases of empirical investigations and the evolution of theory over time. Third, we return to basics and focus on the refinements of metrics and quantification of the core concepts. All of this pertains to the world, as we have known it prior to the construction of the Internet, the core of cyberspace. Fourth, we then turn briefly to results so far of our o research on lateral pressure in the cyber domain.  The Endnote highlights some emerging imperatives.
</summary>
<dc:date>2016-11-11T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
</feed>
