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dc.contributor.authorEckaus, Richard S.en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-15T23:59:19Z
dc.date.available2009-12-15T23:59:19Z
dc.date.issued1992en_US
dc.identifier92014en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50197
dc.description.abstractThe use of the atmosphere as a dumping place for greenhouse gases has been a matter of laissez faire. Proposals for international agreement to restrict the rate of such emissions are, in effect, proposals for collectively determined controls. The alternative proposed here is, "nationalization," which would give each country a share in the global carrying capacity and allow each country to determine the timing and best use of its share. The advantage of nationalization of the global commons is that it would allow each country to determine its own path toward its allocated accumulation level, rather than having that path determined by international negotiations or an international authority. There is a prima facie case that, in general, countries can make better decisions for their own welfare than can international authorities. The allocation of shares in global carrying capacity according to the population size of each country, with debits for previous accountable emissions would be a means of achieving international equity. If the allocation were based on populations in some post World War Ii year, say, 1950, it would recognize the fact that most developing countries became responsible for their own economies only after achieving independence from colonial rule. This rule would also carry an implicit penalty for high growth rates of population and emissions since 1950.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSupported by the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, the Rockefeller Foundation and the National Science Foundation.en_US
dc.format.extent27 pen_US
dc.publisherMIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Researchen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 92-014WP.en_US
dc.titleLaissez faire, collective control or nationalization of the global commonsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.oclc35719714en_US


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