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dc.contributor.authorForsberg, Charles
dc.contributor.authorKadak, Andrew
dc.date.accessioned2025-04-15T14:35:02Z
dc.date.available2025-04-15T14:35:02Z
dc.date.issued2025-04-11
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/159161
dc.description.abstractThe use of graphite-matrix tri-structural-isotropic (TRISO) fuels in high-temperature reactors with high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) can significantly reduce nuclear weapons proliferation risks relative to other fuels and reactor types. The HALEU fuel, with fuels containing 15% to 20% 235U enable used nuclear fuels (UNFs) with thermal neutron–spectrum burnups between 150 000 and 200 000 MWd per ton. At these high burnups, the plutonium isotopics make the direct use for nuclear weapons unattractive and the uranium isotopics unattractive as a feed to a uranium-enrichment plant. On the front end, it would require the theft of ~150 000 pebbles with uranium just under 20% 235U to create the theoretical potential to produce sufficient material for one weapon (1000 kg), which is about a 2-year supply of fuel for these reactors. The chemical and mechanical processing requirements to convert fresh TRISO fuel to uranium metal for use in a nuclear weapon are beyond nonstate actors. Over 10 sequential chemical process steps would be required, plus uranium recovery from waste streams, to avoid large uranium losses in the conversion processes. If a nation-state wanted to make a nuclear weapon starting with HALEU fuel, they would enrich the HALEU from 19.95% to over 90% 235U, which presumes they already possess enrichment capabilities and can use any uranium feedstock. If enriched to weapons-grade 235U, 1 ton of HALEU has sufficient 235U for multiple weapons. Separately, it is not clear if a weapon can actually be built with HALEU fuel. The fuel characteristics also reduce risks from sabotage. Consequently, we conclude that reactor safeguards for fresh HALEU TRISO fuel can be similar to those for low-enriched uranium light water reactor fuel; that is, no requirements for added security or other measures. TRISO UNF safeguards and security can be significantly relaxed relative to the requirements for other types of UNF at the reactor site.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen_US
dc.relation.isversionof10.1080/00295450.2025.2462378en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attributionen_US
dc.rightsAn error occurred on the license name.*
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceTaylor & Francisen_US
dc.titleReducing Proliferation Risks with High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Fuels in Reactors with Coated-Particle (TRISO) Fuelsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationForsberg, C., & Kadak, A. (2025). Reducing Proliferation Risks with High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Fuels in Reactors with Coated-Particle (TRISO) Fuels. Nuclear Technology, 1–8.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineeringen_US
dc.relation.journalNuclear Technologyen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.date.submission2025-04-15T14:32:59Z
mit.licensePUBLISHER_CC
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work and Publication Information Neededen_US


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