Runtime Bounds for a Coevolutionary Algorithm on Classes of Potential Games

Abstract

Coevolutionary algorithms are a family of black-box optimisation algorithms with many applications in game theory. We study a coevolutionary algorithm on an important class of games in game theory: potential games. In these games, a real-valued function defined over the entire strategy space encapsulates the strategic choices of all players collectively. We present the first theoretical analysis of a coevolutionary algorithm on potential games, showing a runtime guarantee that holds for all exact potential games, some weighted and ordinal potential games, and certain non-potential games. Using this result, we show a polynomial runtime on singleton congestion games. Furthermore, we show that there exist games for which coevolutionary algorithms find Nash equilibria exponentially faster than best or better response dynamics, and games for which coevolutionary algorithms find better Nash equilibria as well. Finally, we conduct experimental evaluations showing that our algorithm can outperform widely used algorithms, such as better response on random instances of singleton congestion games, as well as fictitious play, counterfactual regret minimisation (CFR), and external sampling CFR on dynamic routing games.