| dc.contributor.author | Setiya, Kieran | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-12-18T18:28:15Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-12-18T18:28:15Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-01-02 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/164407 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper argues for a theory of natural rights on which they are explained in terms of reasons supplied by rational consent. When B has a claim-right against A that A φ, A’s non-consent is not a reason for B not to simply make A φ. This theory solves a puzzle that defeats alternative views, including standard will and interest theories, the demand theory of rights, and the view that rights are irreducible or primitive. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | 10.1080/00048402.2024.2379266 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | Taylor & Francis | en_US |
| dc.title | What is a Right? | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Setiya, K. (2025). What is a Right? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 103(1), 106–117. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Final published version | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2025-12-18T18:15:49Z | |
| dspace.orderedauthors | Setiya, K | en_US |
| dspace.date.submission | 2025-12-18T18:15:50Z | |
| mit.journal.volume | 103 | en_US |
| mit.journal.issue | 1 | en_US |
| mit.license | PUBLISHER_CC | |
| mit.metadata.status | Authority Work and Publication Information Needed | en_US |
