| dc.contributor.author | Kang, Benjamin | |
| dc.contributor.author | Unwin, James | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-03-03T14:20:32Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-03-03T14:20:32Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2026-01-09 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/164983 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here, we consider a number of alternative forfeits that might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts. | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010002 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute | en_US |
| dc.title | All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Kang, Benjamin, and James Unwin. 2026. "All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits" Games 17, no. 1: 2. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Games | en_US |
| dc.identifier.mitlicense | PUBLISHER_CC | |
| dc.eprint.version | Final published version | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2026-02-26T13:57:54Z | |
| dspace.date.submission | 2026-02-26T13:57:53Z | |
| mit.journal.volume | 17 | en_US |
| mit.journal.issue | 1 | en_US |
| mit.license | PUBLISHER_CC | |
| mit.metadata.status | Authority Work and Publication Information Needed | en_US |