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dc.contributor.authorKang, Benjamin
dc.contributor.authorUnwin, James
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-03T14:20:32Z
dc.date.available2026-03-03T14:20:32Z
dc.date.issued2026-01-09
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/164983
dc.description.abstractIn an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here, we consider a number of alternative forfeits that might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.en_US
dc.publisherMultidisciplinary Digital Publishing Instituteen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.3390/g17010002en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attributionen_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceMultidisciplinary Digital Publishing Instituteen_US
dc.titleAll-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeitsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationKang, Benjamin, and James Unwin. 2026. "All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits" Games 17, no. 1: 2.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematicsen_US
dc.relation.journalGamesen_US
dc.identifier.mitlicensePUBLISHER_CC
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2026-02-26T13:57:54Z
dspace.date.submission2026-02-26T13:57:53Z
mit.journal.volume17en_US
mit.journal.issue1en_US
mit.licensePUBLISHER_CC
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work and Publication Information Neededen_US


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